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THE IDEA OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS 
Eugene E. Selk 
Department of Philosophy 
Creighton University 
Omaha, Nebraska 68178 
Recently the problem of scientific progress has been one of the 
most widely discussed topics among historians and philosophers of 
science. But little has been said on the problem of technological prog-
ress. I suggest that theories of technological progress can be divided, 
fIrst, into cognitive and non-cognitive; then cognitive can be subdivided 
into cumulative and problem-solving; non-cognitive can be divided into 
material well-being and moral and spiritual well-being. After examining 
different versions of the cumulative theory, I conclude that technology 
is not intrinsically cumulative; whether technology is cumulatively 
progressive is a matter of goals extrinsic to technology. I argue that 
Laudan's recent problem-solving theory of scientific progress seems to 
fIt technology exceptionally well; but this notion of progress turns out 
to be rather emaciated. The material well-being model of technological 
progress is the position that technology can endow human life with 
"new inventions and riches." This model raises many thorny problems 
concerning what constitutes man's material well-being. Finally, the 
moral and spiritual well-being model states that technology can improve 
man's ability to achieve moral and spiritual goals; but what these goals 
are varies widely from position to position. My general conclusion is 
that technology does not, with two exceptions which are minimal, 
contain any intrinsic direction toward betterment. I then briefly note 
some implications of this conclusion. 
t t t 
INTRODUCTION 
The liveliest topic of discussion in the philosophy of 
science in the past decade has been on the nature of scientific 
progress. The focus on this problem marks a striking change 
from the beginnings of the professionalization of the philos-
ophy of science in the 1920s. The Logical Positivist approach 
toward the philosophy of science consisted in the attempt to 
find, by detailed logical analysis, the timeless and universal 
meanings and structures of all scientific knowledge (e.g., 
the meaning of "law," "causality," "probability," and the 
pattern of validation, the logical structure of scientific theo-
ries). This approach regarded the psychology of scientific 
discovery and the evolution of scientific concepts as largely 
irrelevant to an understanding of the scientific enterprise. 
Beginning in the late 1950s, the positivist approach to science 
came under increasing attack. The assault was led by Hanson 
(1958), Kuhn (1970), Toulmin (1953), and Bohm (1957), 
and it was based primarily on the thesis that presuppositions 
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play a dominant role in science. Since these presuppositions 
were time-rooted, the new approach emphasized the history 
of science; and the examination of the history of science 
inevitably led to inquiry into the progress of science. 
The emphasis on the importance of presuppositions in 
determining the problems which scientists address as well as 
the types of solutions which they find acceptable inevitably 
led to a dilemma: If scientists are always approaching the 
world with conceptual frameworks (or if one prefers, para-
digms or traditions), then how can discovery take place? If 
scientists look at the world according to their mental sets, how 
can they ever see anything new? Moreover, when a discovery 
is made, what standards determine whether it is acceptable? 
The appeal to observation and experiment is no longer accept-
able as an answer to this question because observation and 
experiment are themselves conditioned by a conceptual frame-
work. What, then, justifies the claim that one theory is pro-
gressive over its predecessor? In brief, the turn away from the 
positivist emphasis on timeless and universal meanings and 
structures and toward time-rooted Weltanschauungen inevita-
bly led to the problem of scientific progress. The literature on 
this topic has been voluminous beginning with Hanson (1958), 
later Kuhn (1970), and most recently Laudan (1977). 
This voluminous literature on the problem of scientific 
progress has not been matched by inquiry into the idea of 
technological progress. A large literature does exist on effects 
of technology on society and on economic growth; but this 
sort of inquiry is very different from investigation into the 
idea of technological progress. 
Just as the issue of scientific progress is closely related to 
some other significant issues -i.e., the rationality of science 
and the concept of truth in science -so also the issue of tech-
nological progress has significant implications. Perhaps the 
most important one is the means-use model of technology. 
This model states that technology is a neutral means; whether 
it is used for good or evil purposes is not a matter of the 
nature of technology itself, but rather how man uses it. After 
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examining the problem of technological progress, I shall con-
clude with a brief discussion of the implications of the posi-
tion I adopt on this means-use model. 
In discussing the idea of technological progress, I shall lay 
out different models of technological progress. The emphasis 
shall be on constructing the logical possibilities, rather than on 
a historical survey of positions which have actually been taken 
on the progress of technology. However, as a touchstone for 
assembling and analyzing various logical possibilities, I shall 
frequently discuss some of the most important historical 
theories. 
Before beginning this inquiry, it will be helpful to engage 
in a brief analysis of the idea of progress. Van Doren (1967), 
in his exhaustive study of the idea of progress, suggests that 
the core residue of meaning which can be extracted from writ-
ings on progress includes at least three ideas: (1) a pattern of 
change; (2) which is, in the long run, irreversible; and (3) 
which is directed toward an advance in value, toward that 
which is better (Van Doren, 1967:3). Progress is a pattern of 
change, but it is more than that. It is change in the direction 
of improvement. In addition, a theory of progress need not 
claim that progress is change which is always moving in a 
straight line toward improvement. Obviously, such a require-
ment would rule out progress in anything. Progress, rather, is 
change which is moving in one direction, toward betterment, 
for the most part and over the long run. 
Finally, a note is in order on the classificatory scheme 
which I shall use in this paper. Models of technological and 
scientific change seem to fall into two general groupings: 
cognitive and non-cognitive. The tag "normative" might be 
used instead of non-cognitive, but I have avoided this because 
some might claim, and I would tend to agree with them, that 
cognitive theories also contain many normative elements. 
Cognitive models are those which claim that technology 
is progressing because in some way it is growing in knowledge. 
In this category, I shall discuss two models: cumulative and 
problem-solving. Non-cognitive models are those which claim 
that technology is progressing because it is moving ~oward 
some normative goal. There appear to be two principal types 
of non-cognitive models: the material well-being model, and 
the moral and spiritual well-being model. 
COGNITIVE MODELS 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
1. The Cumulative Model 
The theory of technological progress which has the great-
est weight of tradition behind it is the cumulative model. 
This theory has its roots in the cumulative theory of scientific 
progress, and, accordingly, we shall first examine that verSion 
of the theory. We shall then turn to technology and explore 
the possibility of applying the model to that area. 
The classic defense of the cumulative model of scientific 
progress was offered by Francis Bacon (in Warhaft, 1965). He 
argued that for the first time in history it was possible for 
knowledge to march steadily toward unlocking the secrets of 
nature. What was the basis of this claim? The key for Bacon 
was method: 
There are and can be only two ways of searching into 
and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses 
and particulars to the most general axioms .... And 
this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms 
from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual 
and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most 
general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but 
as yet untried (Bacon, in Warhaft, 1965 :333). 
Bacon went on, of course, and elaborated considerably on this 
idea of a reformed, inductive method. But his great idea was 
that he had discovered the scientific method, and that if this 
method is applied carefully and consistently, it will guarantee 
the progress of scientific knowledge-i.e., the movement of 
knowledge toward the truth. 
Some of the sharpest statements on the cumulative theory 
of scientific progress were made by the nineteenth century 
American Pragmatist, Charles Sanders Peirce, and his state-
ment of the theory may serve as a summary of the position 
(in Hartshorne and Weiss, 1935 :23). 
Science is to mean for us a mode of life whose single 
animating purpose is to find out the real truth, which 
pursues this purpose by a well-considered method, 
founded on thorough acquaintance with such scien-
tific results already ascertained by others as may be 
available, and which seeks cooperation in the hope 
that the truth may be found, if not by any of the 
actual inquirers, yet ultimately by those who come 
after them and who shall make use of their results. 
And in a marvelously vivid metaphor, Peirce (in Hartshorne 
and Weiss, 1935 :4) summarizes this idea: 
The idea of science is to pile the ground before the 
foot of the outworks of truth with the carcasses of 
this generation and perhaps others to come after it, 
until some future generation, by treading on them, 
can storm the citadel. 
In sum, the essentials of the cumulative theory of scien-
tific progress are the following. Scientific knowledge is steadily 
moving toward the truth, or an increasing approximation of 
reality, and it is doing so because of scientific method. Man 
has been accumulating knowledge for centuries, but only since 
the Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries has mankind discovered the proper method for 
investigating nature. Scrupulous use of this method shall lead 
to a steady and irreversible uncovering of the secrets of nature. 
What is significant about this theory for our purposes is that it 
is an internal theory of progress. It is internal in two respects. 
First, the essence of science is a method, which if used proper-
ly, will move knowledge toward an increasing understanding 
of the physical world. This increased understanding, or if one 
prefers, truth, is the second internal aspect of this theory of 
progress. It suggests that it is part of the very meaning of 
science to move toward tn/th, in the sense of the way things 
really are. 
While the cumulative theory of scientific progress con-
tinues to be defended widely, it is not without problems. 
The weakest plank in the Baconian and Enlightenment notion 
of scientific progress is the almost unquestioning faith in 
method. For Bacon and many of the other defenders of this 
theory, scientific method was conceived in almost purely 
mechanical terms. Data are collected, and hypotheses extra-
polated from the data are then tested by observation and 
experiment. The belief was that if the rules were followed 
properly, truth would be nearly guaranteed. The criticisms of 
this conception of scientific method are well known and need 
not be repeated here. It will suffice to note that Bacon and 
the other defenders of this conception of method underes-
timated the illogical character of the origin of scientific 
hypotheses. Hypotheses, the sine qua non of scientific inquiry, 
cannot be cranked out in some mechanical fashion. They 
seem to require insight or creative imagination which is ultima-
tely not reducible to rational analysis or to a set of logical 
rules. But we may grant that a more sophisticated theory of 
method could be compatible with the cumulative theory 
of scientific progress. 
In addition to the problem of method, there are also the 
perennial epistemological critiques of the cumulative view. 
These critiques center on the concept of truth and reality and 
ask a cluster of vexing questions: How can we know whether 
science is approaching the truth? If truth is taken in the sense 
of the way things really are, how can we ever know this 
dimension of reality? Are we in contact only with our ex-
periences of reality? This is not the place to take up these 
classical philosophical questions. But I would like to defend 
brietly the soundness of the notion that science is a quest for 
and a movement toward truth, since this claim will be central 
to my conclusion to this section. 
The history of science indicates that many, and perhaps 
even most, of the discoveries in science sooner or later find 
practical application. In fact, Jonas (1976: 15-17) argued that 
this has become increasingly the case in the twentieth century. 
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The only exceptions to this phenomenon seem to be theories 
of cosmogony (e.g., the big-bang) and some areas of particle 
physics. This suggests that if a scientific theory is at least 
partially true, it has at least some capacity to generate tech-
nological or other concrete applications. Conversely, if some 
scientific principle is found to result in useful technology, then 
in some aspect or another it embodies a truth about the 
world (Quay, 1974: 160). [n brief, the fact that a body of 
scientific knowledge has concrete applications is one of the 
tests of the truth of that knowledge. Thus, there does seem to 
be some basis for claiming that scientific knowledge is moving 
toward truth. 
We shall now turn to the central question for our pur-
poses: Can the cumulative model of scientific progress, or 
some modified version of it, be applied to technology? At first 
glance, it would appear that it is nonsensical to talk about 
technology as moving toward an increasing understanding of 
the physical world, or of moving toward the truth. This would 
appear to be a fundamental difference between scientific 
and technological progress. Scientific progress is at least in 
some sense, as we just argued, a progressive movement toward 
a greater understanding of the physical world. Technology, by 
contrast, is not directed toward truth or understanding the 
world. Technology deals with the world of created devices 
and techniques, and these do not have to "fit" reality, except 
in the trivial sense that they cannot disobey the laws of nature 
(e.g., the technologist cannot build a rocket which travels 
faster than the speed of light). If there is any sense of truth in 
technology, it is Vico's notion of ven/m factum -man can 
have certain knowledge of his creations because he has made 
them. But this notion of truth, unless one is an unvarnished 
idealist, is very different from the notion of truth in science. 
Thus, at first look, it does not appear that there is techno-
logical progress in the sense of a step-by-step movement 
toward the truth. 
But the situation is a bit more complicated than this. 
The history of science and technology is filled with instances 
of technological devices aiding in science's quest for unravel-
ling the secrets of nature. The most famous example of this is 
Galileo's use of the telescope to make new astronomical 
discoveries and to defend Copernicanism (albeit very indirect-
ly). The electron microscope is an example of a technological 
device which is based on scientific theory but which has also 
contributed to the development of new theory. Shall we con-
clude, then, that there is cumulative technological progress 
insofar as technology contributes to the movement toward 
truth? This conclusion would be too sweeping. First, this 
notion of technological progress is too limited in scope, for it 
applies only to those technologies which have actually led to 
new discoveries in science. But in the history of technology, 
most technologies prior to the twentieth century were devel-
oped independently of science and had little if any influence 
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on the development of science. For example, cheesemaking, 
brewing, and metal-making were developed long before the 
Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies and had no apparent influence on that revolution. Thus, 
we may conclude that some technologies have sometimes 
aided science in its quest for an understanding of the universe. 
But even here, the progress is not really technological progress 
toward truth as much as it is scientific progress with the aid 
of technology. Science is frequently parasitic with respect to 
technology. In conclusion, there is no basis for claiming that 
technology progresses in the sense that it moves toward the 
truth. 
But is there, then, some other notion of the cumulative 
theory of technological progress? There are three remaining 
possibilities: the quantitative increase of technology over time, 
the increase in the power of technology, and the building of 
one technology on another. In regard to the first possibility, 
there has been an obvious increase in the number of tech-
nological devices and techniques in the West since approxi-
mately the sixth century. This movement began with the 
stirrup, rotation of crops, the Saxon wheeled-plough, the horse 
collar, and the crank, and moved on in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries to the steam-engine, telephone, camera, 
electric lights, nuclear power-plants, and on and on. The 
number of technological devices has probably been increas-
ing exponentially since the Industrial Revolution. 
But this increase is not only quantitative. It is also -and 
this is the second remaining possibility - marked by a dramatic 
increase in man's power over nature. Jonas (I 974: 13) regarded 
the power which twentieth-century technology has given man 
as so great that it has transformed human nature. Modern 
technology, he argued, has created a "new type of human 
action," one larger and more powerful than ever before. 
The third remaining possibility for a cumulative theory 
of technological progress is the notion that many technological 
inventions are based on preceding technological devices or 
processes. The history of technology is filled with illustrations 
of this phenomenon. One brief case history constructed from 
Cardwell (1972:66-69) and Pacey (1974: 120-129) will suffice 
to demonstrate this point. In 1661, the German Otto von 
Guericke constructed a device using a vertically-aligned piston 
and cylinder to lift weights. Air was pumped out of the 
cylinder causing the piston, under the force of atmospheric 
pressure, to descend and to lift the weights. In 1673, Christian 
Huygens and Denis Papin added a charge of gunpowder to von 
Guericke's piston. Papin later refined this machine further by 
using condensed steam to create a vacuum in the cylinder. 
Finally, Thomas Newcomen and John Cawley took the idea of 
the cylinder and piston which von Guericke, Huygens, and 
Papin had developed, plus Papin's idea of creating a vacuum 
by the condensation of steam, and added a mechanism for 
turning valves on and off in the right sequence. Here is a clear 
case, then, of the development of a technology by the bUild_ 
ing up of one invention on another. 
Now is there any basis for claiming that any or all of 
these types of accumulation-quantitative, in power, and 
building up-are progressive? A few examples will illustrate 
that the answer must be negative. Many large and complex 
technological devices and techniques-large and complex 
in size, power, and the degree to which they are built up 
on simpler technologies-have brought with them effects 
which are generally regarded as regressive. The airplane, 
rockets, and conventional and atomic bombs have drama-
tically increased man's ability to wage devastating wars. The 
factory system has dehumanized labor. Nuclear-power reactors 
have generated large amounts of wastes which are difficult 
to dispose of safely. Technology has also, admittedly, dramati-
cally improved the human condition in many ways. But the 
point of these examples is this: The cumulative movement of 
technology-whether quantitative, in power, or in building 
up-does not contain any intrinsic measure of progress. 
From the cumulative point of view, whether technology 
is progressive or regressive is a matter of extrinsic value 
choices. 
2. The Problem-Solving Model 
In a recent work, Laudan (1977) developed an elaborate 
theory of scientific progress which he called a "problem-
solving model." Following our procedure in the previous sec-
tion, we shall examine Laudan's theory of scientific progress 
and then investigate whether this model might be applicable 
to technology. 
Laudan failed to offer a definition of what he meant by a 
problem. Here he would have been well-advised to consult 
Peirce's classic essay "The Fixation of Belief." Peirce (in Hart-
shorne and Weiss, 1934: 230) argued that all inquiry begins 
with "an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle 
to free ourselves." This psychological notion of uneasiness 
and dissatisfaction may be taken as a good definition of a 
problem. 
To return to Laudan's model, he took as his central claim 
that "science as a problem-solving system [is] ... what is 
most characteristic about science ... ; the aim of science ... 
is the resolution and clarification of problems ... " (Laudan, 
1977: 12). To emphasize the unorthodox nature of this claim, 
Laudan contrasted this position with the usual view that the 
empirical scientist is primarily interested in "explaining" the 
world of empirical facts. He argued that scientific theories are 
not attempts to give high·order explanations of laws and facts, 
but rather to provide solutions to problems. Not only did 
Laudan wish to debunk the importance of facts in science, 
he also played down the importance of the role of "confirma-
tion" and the notion of "truth" in science. 
In appraising the merits of theories, it is more impor-
tant to ask whether they constitute adequate solu-
tions to significant problems than it is to ask whether 
they are "true," "corroborated," "well confirmed," 
or otherwise justifiable within the framework of con-
temporary epistemology (Laudan, 1977: 12). 
In determining whether a theory solves a problem, and 
whether it is, accordingly, acceptable, Laudan claimed that "it 
is irrelevant whether the theory is true or false, well or poorly 
confirmed ... (Laudan, 1977:22-23). And further, " ... scien-
tists generally do not consider matters of truth and falsity 
when determining whether a theory does or does not solve a 
particular empirical problem" (Laudan, 1977:24). Although 
Laudan's critique of the orthodox notions of confirmation and 
truth in science is based primarily on historical grounds, he 
could not resist mentioning the traditional epistemological 
difficulties with these notions: 
We apparently do not have any way of knowing for 
sure ... that science is true, or probable, or that it 
is getting closer to the truth. Such aims are utopian, 
in the literal sense that we can never know whether 
they are being achieved (Laudan, 1977: 127). 
The essential units of science, on Laudan's account, are 
"research traditions." A research tradition is a "set of assump-
tions: assumptions about the basic kinds of entities in the 
world, assumptions about how those entities interact, assump-
tions about the proper methods to use for construction and 
testing theories about these entities" (Laudan, 1977:97). 
Examples of research traditions are Aristotelianism, Cartesian-
ism, Darwinism, Newtonianism, mechanistic biology, and 
Freudian psychology. It should be emphasized that what are 
ordinarily called scientific theories-e.g., Aristotle's theory of 
astronomy, or molecular genetics-are, on Laudan's account, 
components of research traditions. A research tradition may 
be composed of multiple theories plus a methodology, experi-
mentation, and even metaphysics. The main point for our 
purposes is that, according to Laudan, research traditions 
are the frameworks used to attack problems, and they are also 
the problem-solutions. 
Now what is progress within Laudan's theory of science? 
Progress can occur on two levels: within research traditions or 
between them. Progress within a research tradition is simply 
any change in a theory, law, method, or experiment which 
solves or comes closer to solving a problem within the tradi-
tion. To put the matter briefly and bluntly, progress is any 
change which is in the direction of the solution of a problem. 
But what about the relationship between research traditions? 
Is there any way of knowing whether the replacement of one 
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research tradition by another is progressive? Laudan argued 
that because of their generality and because of their normative 
elements, research traditions are not directly testable (Laudan, 
1977 :81-82). But one research tradition is better than another 
and thus is progressive if it "leads, via its component theories, 
to the adequate solution of an increasing range of empirical 
and conceptual problems" (Laudan, 1977 :82). But Laudan 
emphasized again that such problem-solving success tells us 
nothing about whether the tradition is "confirmed" or "re-
futed," or "true" or "false" (Laudan, 1977:82). 
Before examining whether this model fits technological 
progress, a few critical comments are in order. First, Laudan's 
devaluation (he carefully noted that he was not totally rejecting 
the concepts) of the notions of confirmation and truth do 
not seem to be carried through consistently even in his own 
elaboration of the model. Thus, for example, Laudan stated 
that one theory is better than another if its predictions are 
"tested," and if some of them are "borne out in our observa-
tion" (Laudan, 1977:67). Again, he argued that theories are 
components of research traditions, and the successful test of 
a theory is at the same time at least a partial test of the "ade-
quacy" of a research tradition (Laudan, 1977 :82). But what 
does Laudan mean by checking predictions and making obser-
vations unless some sort of encounter with reality? One need 
not be a naive realist to accept that there is some sort of 
reality out there which is pressing against our ideas and con-
stantly checking and directing them, albeit the linkage be-
tween our ideas and reality may be very indirect. My point is, 
in brief, that in the end I do not believe that Laudan can 
escape using reality and truth as criteria for evaluating theories 
and research traditions, and by that fact progress. 
Laudan's assertion that the aim of science is problem-
solving is also inadequate. Even if we grant that much or most 
of science is concerned with problem-solving, this is at most 
the immediate end of science. We may still ask: Problem-
solving for what? Are scientists simply interested in resolving 
the immediate puzzles at hand and nothing more? Why are 
they even interested and motivated to seek solutions to 
problems? The orthodox position on the ends of science seems 
still to stand: The ultimate or highest goals of science are: 
(1) either the desire to understand the world, or (2) the 
desire to gain control over the world for the sake of improving 
the human condition. Granted, the aim of understanding 
the world may be an ideal limit which can never be attained. 
Nevertheless, it does play a central role in scientific inquiry. 
Laudan seems to deny that there are any "higher" or long-
range motives behind the activity of the scientist. 
The problem-solving model of progress may, in fact, fit 
technology much better than science. Investigation of this 
possibility will be our next task. If we use Peircc's notion of 
a problem as an "uneasiness" or an "irritation" of the mind, 
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then technological inquiry does indeed seem to begin in this 
fashion. A case history will be useful for illustrating this claim 
and for testing the applicability of the problem-solving model 
to technology in general. 
In 1712, Thomas Newcomen built a steam engine that 
combined for the first time a piston-in-cylinder and a motive 
principle which involved the formation of a vacuum within 
the cylinder through the induced condensation of steam 
(Usher, 1962:347-357; Sherer, 1965). In the winter of 1763-
1764, James Watt, while repairing a model of the Newcomen 
engine, was perplexed by the large amount of steam it used 
(Usher, 1962 :353). Usher, a historian of technology, termed 
this perplexity the first stage in the process of invention. He 
called it the "perception of a problem," and defined a problem 
as an "incomplete or unsatisfactory pattern," or "an unful-
filled want" (Usher, 1962:65). 
Returning to the steam engine case-history, further inves-
tigation led Watt to realize that the inefficiency of the engine 
was caused by two conflicting requirements: To utilize steam 
efficiently, the cylinder had to be kept at 100 C; but to form 
a vacuum for the power stroke, the cylinder had to be cooled 
below 100 C (Sherer: 167). Usher (1962:65) called this the 
second stage in the act of invention: "setting the stage." 
In 1765, Watt suddenly had insight to solve the problem: 
He would condense the engine's steam in a separate con-
densing container to which it would be drawn (Sherer, 1965: 
170). This is the third stage, the sudden and dramatic "act 
of insight," which seems to be so essential to creativity, 
whether in the arts, sciences, or technology. We may also call 
this stage, from the viewpoint of the problem-solVing model, 
the solution to the problem. It is not a complete solution 
because much mopping-up work always remains at this stage. 
In fact, to return to Watt's invention, Watt spent fifteen years 
(1765 to 1780) before he completed the development of his 
new engine (Sherer, 1965: 176). He built, tested, modified, and 
retested models of increasing scale and sophistication. Usher 
(1962 :65) called this last stage "critical revision." 
We may now add some other observations on the ap-
plication of Laudan's problem-solving model to technology. 
Laudan's claim that confirmation and truth play an insigni-
ficant role in science seems to be much more true of tech-
nology than of science. In technology, the question is not 
whether the idea is confirmed or refuted, but whether it can 
be carried out in practice. There is a type of testing here, but 
it is not the testing of an idea against given-reality, but rather 
of the idea against the made-reality, the artifact. Again, in 
technology, the question is never whether a technological 
device or process is true or false, but rather whether it ful-
fills the goals for which it was devised. As noted earlier, Vico's 
formula vernm factum applies perfectly to technological 
devices and processes. If we employ the correspondence 
theory of truth, then we may say that a technological artifact 
is true not because it conforms to reality, but because it con-
forms to the idea in the inventor's mind. Truth is made by 
man. But, of course we are using truth here in a rather ex-
tended sense, and we may prefer simply to state that truth and 
falsity have no place in technology. 
We may conclude at this point that technology comes 
closer than science to Laudan's problem-solVing model. But 
the critical question remains: Is the problem-solving model a 
sound theory of technological progress? The answer will not 
be unequivocal and will require a distinction introduced by 
Laudan (referred to above). Laudan made a distinction be-
tween (1) progress within a problem, and (2) progress in the 
movement from one problem-solution to another (he referred 
to research traditions). It does seem sound to assert that there 
is technological progress in the first sense. There is progress 
as the inventor moves from awareness of a problem to its 
resolution through creation of a technological device or 
process. Thus, here progress is simply movement in the direc-
tion of the solution of a specific problem. 
There are some distinct advantages of such a theory of 
technological progress. First, it has the value of concreteness 
and precision. There is always something vague and troubling 
about the notion of technology progressing toward truth, or 
the material and spiritual well-being of mankind. Secondly, 
the theory seems to be an intrinsic theory of progress. If 
problem-solving is of the very essence of technology, then 
there is a notion of progress internal to technology-namely, 
the movement toward the solution of a problem. 
But when all is said and done, this notion of technological 
progress is very emaciated. When we speak of technological 
progress in modern discourse, we are usually referring to long-
term improvement of some sort. Can we say, under the 
problem-solving model, that technology is moving toward 
some sort of betterment as it moves from one problem-
solution to another problem-solution? In short, is there any 
way of determining whether technology progresses between 
problem-solutions? Laudan (1977:78), speaking of scientific 
progress, solved the problem of determining whether there is 
progress between problem-solutions by appealing to such 
criteria as the internal consistency of the theories within one 
research tradition compared to the consistency of those within 
a competing research tradition, the degree of generality of the 
problem, the age of the problem, and the number of problems 
which a theory solves. But none of these criteria appears to 
be applicable to technological devices and processes. In tech-
nology, the fact that one problem-solution is regarded as more 
significant than another seems to be a matter of historical 
circumstance and cultural and personal choices. Thus, the fact 
that the development of solar energy is regarded as a significant 
problem in the United States today is because of the depletion 
of our domestic reserves of oil and our high degree of depen-
dence on foreign oil. But these causes can be pushed back 
another stage. Our need for oil at all is a result of our depen-
dence on the automobile, modern air travel, elaborate indus-
trial machinery, and so on. Similarly, the reason the atomic 
bomb was regarded as important in 1944 was because it 
offered a solution to the prolongation of the war. The alterna-
tive of bombing by conventional means and invading Japan 
did not appear attractive after five years of warfare. On the 
basis of the problem-solving model, therefore, there is nothing 
in the structure of technology which can serve as a basis for 
ci:<iming that the movement of technology from one problem-
soi1.:tion to another problem-solution is progressive. The only 
way \0 evaluate whether there is such a progression is by an 
appeal\to extrinsic goals or values. 
In sum, the problem-solving model does have this value: 
It allows us to say that there is progress within a specific field 
(or sub field) within relatively short periods of time - that is, 
in the movement from the awareness of a problem to its 
solution. But when we ask the broader question, "Is tech-
nology progressing?" the problem-solving model seems to be 
of little help. The model does not contain any internal cri-
terion for determining whether there is progress when we 
move from one problem-solution to another problem-solution. 
NON-COGNITIVE MODELS 
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
On the basis of our examination of the cumulative and 
problem-solving models, we may draw the general conclusion 
that the important question is not whether technology ad-
vances either in the cumulative sense or in the problem-solving 
sense. The crucial question is whether technology advances 
for the better-i.e., whether it is progressive. Is man's accumu-
lation of technical devices and procedures and his piling up 
of problem-solutions an advance toward betterment? We 
concluded that there is nothing in the internal structure of 
technology which can serve as a basis for claiming that tech-
nology is progressive, except in the very limited sense of the 
movement toward the solution of a specific problem. 
We shall now tum to non-cognitive theories of technologi-
cal progress-i.e., theories which do not define progress in 
terms of an increase in knowledge. Traditionally, two general 
non-cognitive goals of technology have been defended: an 
improvement in the material well-being of man, and an 
improvement in the moral and spiritual well-being of man. 
1. Material Well-being 
Bacon is again the locus classicus for this model. We have 
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already observed that Bacon claimed that his age was wit-
nessing a new power to unravel the secrets of nature, and this 
new power was a consequence of the new scientific method 
(actually, a reformed inductive method). And one of the 
ends of this new scientific and technological knowledge was 
"the endowment of human life with new inventions and 
riches" (in Warhaft, 1965:354). 
Bacon's position is a very general form of the material 
well-being model. This model can be given more specific form, 
and one of the most popular variants of the position links 
scarcity, technology, and man's material well-being. Edward 
Bellamy's Looking Backward 2000-1887 (in Elliott, 1966) 
presents a classic statement of this argument. Bellamy con-
structs a technocratic utopia in which the planning, produc-
tion, and distribution of goods is accomplished by an elaborate 
social and economic machine. Bellamy'S utopia is techno-
logical not only in the sense that it is a society filled with 
gadgets and machines, but also in the extended sense that the 
society is based on a high degree of rational organization in 
the name of efficiency. The organization of society is like a 
large machine in which personnel are components. Bellamy 
(in Elliott, 1966:170) has Dr. Leete, one of the principal 
characters in the novel, compare the older order to the new: 
The ancien regime, Leete observes, may be likened to "the 
military efficiency of a mob, or a horde of barbarians with a 
thousand petty chiefs, as compared with that of a disciplined 
army under one general-such a fighting machine, for exam-
ple, as the German army in the time of Von Moltke." Julian 
West, the narrator of the novel, agrees with this analogy. In a 
nightmare in which he dreams that he had returned to the old 
order, he observes (in Elliott, 1966: 194) a military parade, and 
reflects that "here at last were order and reason, an exhibition 
of what intelligent cooperation can accomplish." He sees the 
passing regiment not as individuals, but as a "tremendous 
engine ... able to vanquish a mob ten times as numerous." 
And he asks himself why the citizens of the old order "fail 
to compare the scientific manner in which the nation went 
to war with the unscientific manner in which it went to 
work?" 
This new production machine will, according to Bellamy 
(in Elliott, 1966), virtually abolish scarcity. Over the entrance 
to the distribution center --a huge department-store-like 
institution -stands "a majestic life-size group of statuary, the 
central figure of which was a female ideal of Plenty, with her 
cornucopia" (p. 194). Dr. Leete (p. 112) observes that "as 
regards the great staples of life, of which an abundance can 
always be secured, scarcity is eliminated as a factor. There 
is always a great surplus kept on hand from which any fluc-
tuations of demand or supply can be corrected, even in most 
cases of bad crops." And it is clear that in Bellamy's scheme 
this abundance is a result of the great technological machine 
of production. 
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This construction of a chain between technology, scarcity, 
and progress has many weak links. First, technology is only 
one of a network of factors which are necessary to reduce 
scarcity. The way the economic,' social, and political system 
distributes goods is also a primary factor in ameliorating man's 
material estate. And we have no basis for claiming that this 
ensemble of factors is moving, over the long run, toward the 
material improvement of the human condition. 
But a second difficulty is even more telling. One of the 
phenomena of modern technology is the power to expand 
man's wants constantly. Galbraith (1958, 1967, 1974) has 
argued tirelessly that modern capitalism, through mass adver-
tising (a type of technology), is able both to manipulate and 
expand human wants continually. And we might add that it 
is also technology in the form of mass production which 
makes possible the satisfaction of each new level of wants. 
But is there any basis for claiming that this continual 
creation and satisfaction of wants is progressive? Galbraith 
(1967) points out that many wants which are created and 
satisfied are trivial and goods while "public goods" go unmet. 
Technological, capitalist economies produce videotape ma-
chines, synthetic foods, and recreation vehicles, while public 
transportation, housing, and the environment suffer. At this 
point it might be objected that to call synthetic foods trivial 
goods and public transportation public goods is to beg the 
question. This assumes a hierarchy of wants, and this involves 
a value judgment. What is ultimately at issue is the question 
of what constitutes the Good Life, and it is obviously beyond 
our scope here to discuss this question. But perhaps we can 
circumvent this perennial question by making a distinction 
between types of needs and wants. 
The basic cut that seems to be required in any discussion 
of wants and needs is between basic biological needs and non-
biological or conditioned wants and needs. The former are the 
basic requirements for physical survival-food, minimal shel-
ter, and perhaps companionship. The latter are all those needs 
which are a product of one's particular society and culture. 
The class of non-biological wants and needs can be further sub-
divided into subsistence needs and luxurious needs. Subsis-
tence needs are those which must be fulfilled to live a mini-
mally decent life in a specific society. These will obviously 
vary greatly from society to society. A minimally decent 
life in the United States is drastically different from a mini-
mally decent life in Rwanda, eastern Africa. All needs beyond 
subsistence may be classified as luxurious needs-albeit some 
luxurious needs (e.g., a color television in the United States) 
will be much closer to subsistence needs than others (e.g., a 
Mercedes Benz in the United States) (see Gendron, 1977: 
216-219). 
The relevance of this discussion to the question of the role 
of technology in progress toward material well-being is the 
following. We may say minimally that technology has been 
progressive with respect to playing a crucial role in potentially 
fulfilling man's basic needs. Admittedly, millions of people in 
the world are still undernourished and suffering from curable 
diseases; but these are caused by the other part of that en-
semble which we mentioned above, and not by the nature of 
deficiencies of technology. Technology because of its power 
over nature has the ability to fulfill man's basic needs, and 
the desirability of filling basic biological needs seems to be 
beyond question even by the most skeptical ethicians. 
But whether technology is progressive in fulfilling man's 
non-biological needs and wants is entirely dependent on value 
judgments. It is at this point that the critics of technology 
bring in their lists of social ills caused either directly or in-
directly by technology-pollution, compulsive consumption, 
resource depletion, alienated work, mass advertising, and so 
on. It is beyond our present purposes to discuss these so-called 
"negative effects" of technology. The conclusion that may be 
drawn is that the determination of whether technology is pro-
gressive with respect to man's material well-being is, as soon as 
we leave the area of basic biological needs, a matter of a value 
judgment, and such judgment is extrinsic to technology. But 
technology is potentially and intrinsically - because of its 
power to manipulate nature - progressive with respect to ful-
filling man's basic biological needs. 
2. Moral and Spiritual Well-being Models 
If the modern age can no longer say with assurance that 
technology is steadily and irreversibly increasing man's mate-
rial well-being, then is there any sense in which it can say that 
technology is increasing man's moral and spiritual well-being? 
A common Enlightenment theory of moral and spiritual 
progress through science and technology was one which linked 
science and technology to knowledge of moral, social, and 
economic truths. Diderot (in Passmore, 1970:205) capsulized 
this position in his famous statement that "we are criminals 
only because we judge wrongly." 
There are some classic difficulties with this position. Even 
if one holds a rationalistic ethic (what we ought to do is what 
is reasonable), it does not follow that we will be good. Reason 
may tell us what we ought to do, but what we actually do is 
another matter. The mistake of the Enlightenment authors is 
not their linking of reason and virtue, but rather the necessity 
which they claim is present between the two - the assertion 
that if we see what is reasonable we will do it. 
A more modern variant of the moral and spiritual well-
being model is the position which draws a connection between 
scarcity, technology, and moral and spiritual well-being. We 
saw an attempt to draw such a linkage in our discussion of 
the material well-being model. A similar argument is frequent-
ly applied to moral and spiritual well-being. Bellamy (in 
Elliott, 1966) may be taken as one source of this position. In 
addition to the already-mentioned argument that technology 
would bring about a material cornucopia, Bellamy also argued 
that technology's ability to overcome scarcity will bring with 
it the promise of a just society. Julian West, the main char-
acter in Bellamy's Looking Backward states regarding the new 
order: 
The nation is rich and does not wish the people to 
deprive themselves of any good thing. In your day, 
men were bound to lay up goods and money against 
coming failure of the means of support and for their 
children. This necessity made parsimony a virtue. 
But now it would have no such laudable object, and, 
having lost its utility, it has ceased to be regarded as a 
virtue. No man any more has any care for the morrow, 
either for himself or his children, for the nation guar-
antees the nature, education, and comfortable main-
tenance of every citizen from the cradle to the grave 
(in Elliott, 1966: 54-5 5). 
In the new order, technology has overcome scarcity, which 
heretofore was the principal motive for storing up riches. 
Thus, the new abundance has, for the first time in history, 
made possible "the equal wealth and equal opportunities of 
culture which all persons now enjoy ... " (in Elliott, 1966:95). 
In fact, Bellamy in a burst of enthusiasm, even expanded 
this argument to include other virtues. 
In your day [West argues, speaking about the old 
order 1 fully nineteen twentieths of the crime, using 
the word broadly to include all sorts of misdemean-
ors, resulted from the inequality in the possessions of 
individuals; want tempted the poor, lust of greater 
gains, or the desire to preserve former gains, tempted 
the well-to-do. Directly or indirectly, the desire for 
money, which then meant every good thing, was the 
motive of all this crime, the taproot of a vast poison 
growth ... (in Elliott, 1966: 122). 
But the new order "cut this root" by "abolishing want" and 
"checking the accumulation of riches" (in Elliott, 1966: 122). 
And, of course, the abolishing of want was accomplished by 
technology. In brief, the abolition of want through technology 
was largely, although not entirely, responsible for abolishing 
most crime and bringing about a just social order. 
In addition to ushering in a virtuous society, Bellamy 
argued. that technology can help man develop his "higher" 
faculties-what we might call man's spiritual well-being. 
Because of the technological, social machine (described in the 
preceding section), members of the new order may retire at 
forty-five so that they "can fully devote [themselves] to the 
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higher exercise of [their] faculties, the intellectual and spiri-
tual enjoyments and pursuits which alone mean life" (in 
Elliott, 1966:118). 
There are several standard objections to this position, but 
we need note only two. First, only a few seem to be capable 
of the enjoyment of "higher" pleasures. In fact, many persons, 
perhaps even the majority, have no interest in pursuing the 
cultivation of scholarly and artistic pursuits. Should such per-
sons simply be dismissed as less fully developed persons than 
the few who do enjoy the higher pleasures? Secondly, the 
experience of Western societies in recent decades points to 
the naivete of Bellamy's claim that scarcity is the source of 
most social ills. Western Europe, Japan, the United States, 
and Canada have achieved a level of abundance which is almost 
utopian and yet social ills remain and seem even to worsen. 
Whether we agree or disagree with the arguments of 
Diderot and Bellamy, the main point that I would like to draw 
from the survey of these two theories of moral and spiritual 
progress through technology is that the theories depend upon 
extrinsic goals. The production of material abundance, the 
creation of a just society, and the cultivation of man's higher 
faculties are all goals outside of the structure of technology. 
Thus, whether technological change is interpreted as progress 
in the direction of the moral and spiritual betterment of man-
kind is a matter of the values chosen by an individual or 
ascribed to by a society. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing, I wish to examine briefly the implication of 
this study of the idea of technological progress on the means-
use model of technology. This model states that technology 
is a neutral means; whether it is used for good or evil purposes 
is not a matter of the nature of technology itself, but rather of 
how man uses it. This model is immensely popular. Schuma-
cher (1973: 156) assumed it when he called for a change in the 
direction of technology: "[We] are deeply convinced that 
technological development has taken a wrong turn and needs 
to be redirected." Similarly, Pacey (1974:309) stated that 
"the problem [with technology] ... is to define new direc-
tions for technical progress in which there is a promise for the 
future - to decide on objectives for scientific and technological 
development which carry more conviction than many existing 
ones." The continuing popularity of this means-use model is 
indicated by two recent studies of the history of technology. 
Cardwell (1972:223) stated that 
It is not technology that threatens our society and its 
values. For technology is itself a distinctive and de-
pendent offspring of the philosophy, cosmology, and 
religion of that society. Technology is a highly rdined 
instrument, although like all instruments it may be 
mis-applied. 
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And Pacey (I974:309) argued that "the crucial point is that 
the direction of progress [Pacey is referring primarily to tech-
nological progress] is always a matter of choice." 
The means-use model has an unsettlingly facile and 
simplistic ring to it. Is the movement of technology simply a 
matter of man's choice? Is technology always a means or only 
sometimes? Does technology contain a direction which is, at 
least to some degree, outside of the control of man? If it does, 
then the means-use model, at least in its pure form, is invalid. 
Finally, we may ask a further question: If technology does 
contain an internal direction, then is this direction progres-
sive ~i.e., is it moving toward betterment? 
We saw that for the most part our answer to both the 
question concerning intrinsic direction and the question of 
whether this direction is progressive was negative. Since there 
is no intrinsic direction to technology, the cumulative model 
cannot be applied to technology. The problem-solving model 
of technology seems to be valid for the immediate, short-
term solution of a problem, but it cannot be applied to the 
long-run movement of technology. The material well-being 
model does seem to work for the potential fulfillment of 
man's basic biological needs, but it fails once we move beyond 
these needs. Finally, there is nothing in the nature of tech-
nology which moves technology inexorably toward man's 
moral and spiritual improvement. 
Our analysis of technological progress suggests, then, that 
the means-use model of technology is essentially valid. There 
does not appear to be any internal direction to technology, 
much less any internal direction which is progressive~except 
for the minimal senses of short-term moving toward the solu-
tion of a problem and the promise of fulfilling man's basic 
biological needs. 
But we have examined the means-use model only from 
the viewpoint of logical analysis of models of technological 
progress. There are, of course, other perspectives from which 
the means-use model can be viewed. Perhaps one of the most 
important is with respect to the degree that technology plays 
a role in human life. I...et us briefly examine where this ap-
proach might lead. 
A strong case can be made, I believe, for the thesis that in 
earlier times the means-use model was an accurate descrip-
tion of man's relation to technology, but that this model is 
becoming increasingly inaccurate, especially with the advent 
of large-scale technological systems. Collingwood (1945 :8) 
has noted that machines did not playa central role in the lives 
of the Greeks and Romans: 
The Greeks and Romans were not machine users 
except to a very small extent; their catapults and 
water-clocks were not a prominent enough feature 
of their lives to affect the way in which they con-
ceived the relation between themselves and the world. 
But with the Renaissance, technology began to playa greater 
role in man's life (Collingwood, 1945 :9): 
The Renaissance view of nature ... (is partly) ... 
based on the human experience of designing and 
constructing machines .... By the sixteenth century 
. .. the printing press and the windmill, the pump 
and the pulley, the clock ... were established fea-
tures of daily life. Everyone understood the nature of 
a machine .... 
Finally, Winner (1977) argued that the contemporary world 
has witnessed another quantum jump in the development of 
technology - the jump to large-scale technological systems. 
Such systems are "networks of highly advanced development 
--systems characterized by a large size, concentration, exten-
sion, and the complex interconnection of a great number of 
artificial and human parts" (Winner, 1977 :238). These sys-
tems, in contrast to earlier technologies, "do not respond 
positively to human guidance" (Winner, 1977 :227). "Beyond 
a certain level of technological development, the rule of freely-
articulated, strongly-asserted purposes is a luxury that can no 
longer be permitted" (Winner, 1977 :238). Winner formulated 
a new phrase to describe the dynamics of large-scale techno-
logical systems - "reverse adaption," and he described (Winner, 
1977 :227) this phenomenon as follows: 
The goals, purposes, needs, and decisions that are 
supposed to determine what technologies do are in 
important instances no longer the true source of their 
direction. Technical systems become severed from the 
ends originally set for them, and, in effect, reprogram 
themselves and their environment to suit the special 
conditions of their own operation. The artificial slave 
gradually subverts the rule of the master. 
Winner offered this theory as an alternative to the theory 
espoused by Mills (1956) and Galbraith (1967), among others, 
that technical elites are the real rulers in a technological 
society. Winner argued, by contrast, that large-scale techno-
logical systems take on a life of their own, and that human 
ends are forced to conform to these ends. He offered numerous 
illustrations of this phenomenon, and I shall cite only a few. 
First, in large, technically-oriented societies, people "come to 
accept the norms and standards of technical processes as 
central to their lives as a whole" (Winner, 1977 :229, italics 
mine). Efficiency, for example, is no longer applied only to 
the office or assembly line, but to pleasure, leisure, learning, 
and reading (witness the popularity of speed-reading courses). 
Another illustration of the autonomy of large-scale technical 
systems is the tendency for these systems to develop new 
missions after the original mission for which the system was 
developed has been fulfilled. The technological tool is not 
retired. Rather, the system may "take direct action to extend 
its control over the ends themselves" (Winner, 1977 :24 I). 
For example, NASA has flown men to the moon. What shall it 
do now? The agency has proposed many new projects: the 
space shuttle; exploration of Mars, Venus, and Jupiter; and 
asteriod space-colonies. The argument frequently used to sup-
port the continuation of NASA is that such a magnificent 
aerospace team should not be dismantled. 
In sum, the line of argument here is that technologies in 
earlier times were responsive to man's control. But with the 
introduction of large-scale technologies, this is no longer the 
case. Winner argued further that originally all technologies are 
purposive, even large-scale technological systems. Large-scale 
systems come into existence as a result of conscious decisions 
by men. But the control of these systems by man tends to 
decrease as the systems grow and as they become a more 
integral part of human life. 
This position is consistent with the general conclusion 
which we drew from our logical analysis of models of tech-
nological progress. We argued that technology does not con-
tain any inherent direction; the direction of technology, and 
by that fact also its progressiveness, are contingent on man's 
choices. This offers at least some grounds for being optimistic 
about the future direction of technology. 
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